Philosophy experiment

I thought it would be interesting to make a post today before class concerning thoughts of what philosophy is, and then make a post after our discussion over the same subject in order to compare the thought processes before and after. And so I will.

At the beginning of the year, we had a similar discussion. As I recall, we began by dissecting the word philosophy into two parts: love and wisdom (more specifically, a love OF wisdom). I then suggested that we take a closer look at the word “wisdom,” since we all have a fairly clear definition of what we meant as “love.” In our first class, I believe we came to a definition of wisdom roughly resembling “knowledge gained by active experience” (“active” experience meaning that one must actually perform an action or go through a process of experience rather than simply reading a text or being taught by rote). So by that way of thinking we can say that philosophy is a love of gaining knowledge by experiencing things firsthand, and a philosopher is one who loves such a thing. Now, this does not mean that a philosopher loves experiencing things firsthand. This would pertain to a love of something else other than wisdom. Rather, they love gaining knowledge, and the way they must gain knowledge in order for it to be called wisdom is to gain it by firsthand experience. In the same train of thought, a philosopher does not love knowledge, but loves learning. By learning, they do in fact gain knowledge, but that is not what they love.

I will write a new post in response to this one after our discussion today.

Contemplation - is there an end?

In our reading and discussion concerning the contemplative life, I became curious as to just how the ultimate happiness can be a constant contemplation. I thought, if the contemplative life is the happiest, should there not be an end? But there must be an end in order for something to be virtuous. But what of something that never sees its end, or takes an indefinitely long amount of time, so that the end can never be achieved (such as in the case of the contemplative life)? Aristotle poses a similar question, but one that has a different aim;

“…Ought one to assume that our chosen task has its end? Or, as has been said, is the end in matters of action not contemplating and knowing each of them but rather doing them?” (1179a 36 – 1179b 2)

I interpret this question to be more about what the contemplation would be used for, or what one should do instead of contemplation. I am instead asking if and/or how contemplation comes/can come to an end, or if there is an end. Aristotle goes on to say that actions get in the way of contemplation, but humans must take part in actions because they are mortal and need to work and eat. I have come to the conclusion that while actions have conceivable and attainable ends, they therefore come to an end and are not as fulfilling toward a state of being-at-work as contemplation is.

Happiness 2

More thoughts on happiness kind of related to my first blog..and still based off the question from the exam.

There are a few forms of happiness when one breaks it down, but Contemplation is the highest form. Only Gods could contemplate for the rest of their lives, continuously but when people are contemplating they are seeking happiness. Happiness extends as far as contemplation does, and it is a type of contemplation.

When you live a happy life, you have enough wisdom to benefit and work well with others, however you don’t need to work with others to benefit your “happiness, or intellect” since you attain happiness in itself, you are sufficient enough. In order to gain happiness you have to seek what is the most powerful thing in oneself, you have to seek what is presently divine in the soul and go after it, since what is presently divine in the soul surpasses the fused being. While seeking the most powerful being in oneself, you have to live in accordance with it.

Happiness 1

Happiness

Some of these are kind of just random and pondering thoughts that aren't complete. I kind of based them off the question for the exam.

Aristotle says, “ For these feelings extend through the whole of life, having in them a weight and a power that tend toward virtue and toward a happy life, since people choose things that are pleasant and avoid things that are painful” (1171 B. L20-30). Aristotle seems to be implying that people’s natural tendency, by nature, is to seek and capture happiness or what they think is happiness because they know the distinction of pain and pleasure and happiness is some sort of a pleasant experience, which he says shouldn’t be confused with mere pleasure.

“Happiness is the end at which humans aim.” Because of the way it appears to others, it has become extremely desirable. Since it is desirable in itself, it is aligned with the highest virtue, which is intellect. Happiness is sought through the mere practice of doing work because people enjoy the result that they get out of doing that type of work, which points us to how happiness is in accordance with virtue because since people are seeking the beautiful and they are choosing to perform beautiful and serious acts, they are changed at heart and further inspire others to do the same.

Attainable Life

In class, we discussed contemplation as the ultimate end to life. But, it seems that the completely contemplative life is not attainable. If this lifestyle is not attainable, is the pursuit of such satisfying enough in itself?

It seems that through all of our readings the reason for all the good actions is a goal, which seems unachievable. I agreed with the idea that it is beyond human capability to have a completely contemplative lifestyle. However, through performing these good actions, one would presumably feel somewhat better than if they had performed an evil action. So, the culmination of the happiness experienced through these actions is enough to mediate a “happy” life. It seems that the achievement of good along with contemplation (which cannot occur at all times in human life) is the only actual way that Aristotle’s theory of a contemplative, and ultimately happy, life could exist.

The only way for contemplation to work

Aristotle comes to the conclusion in Book X the contemplation is the highest form of happiness. Contemplation is an entirely complete way of thinking while also being fully active in that thought. Contemplation is fixed on a single thought that is continuously the same. Aristotle even says that all pleasures are directed toward this act of contemplation and that people will “live with a view toward living in accord with the most powerful thing in oneself” (1178a). Considering all of this and really thinking about all that goes into contemplation (denying yourself of pleasures, temptations from desires, etc.) and the fact that “nature is not self-sufficient for contemplation” (1178b 30), I wondered, how is this possible to master?

Aristotle addresses this concern when he states, “it is necessary for the soul of the listener to have been worked on beforehand by means of habits” (1179b 20), and “to arrange for rearing and exercises by laws” (1180a). This does not just mean rearing in childhood, but even throughout adulthood (hence laws in the city). The reason why this may be controversial is because, for a corrupt person, these laws and rearing exercises will appear painful. However, “for a decent person who lives with a view to what is beautiful is obedient to argument,” and the laws will seem normal (1180a 10). Therefore the laws will not appear harmful to them but only helpful on their way to true happiness and contemplation. This may seem harsh but history has shown that method works. Aristotle even mentions the Spartans as adhering to the practice of strict rearing and they were one of the most, if not the most, powerful city-states in Ancient Greece. I think that, if contemplation truly is the highest form of happiness, Aristotle is correct in saying these measures must be taken.

Pleasure through pain

What if some pleasures that are not bodily (memories, hopes, etc) that are listed in Book X still arise as pleasure only in their comparison to pain? The types I am discussing likely are not the types of pleasures that Aristotle would say would lead to Happiness and Contemplation but they still seems relevant to everyday life. The best way I could describe my thought is that pleasant memories only seem so pleasant because we are consciously or sub-consciously aware aware of all of our bad memories and that is why we cherish the memories(could be a way of deriving pleasure) that seem pleasurable not their self but because its not bad or painful. I believe we discussed this in class while reading The Republic but from a slightly different viewpoint and Book X of the Nic Ethics has reopened the question for me and I think it deserves some serious thought.

Can friendship come about in people who are vicious?

Aristotle suggests to go about this and distinguish what is loveable. What is loveable would be something like good or pleasure or useful. Useful is something that comes from being good or pleasant, so being good or pleasant is loveable. When speaking in terms of friendship it is necessary to love something which can reciprocate that same feeling, because it would be impossible for an object to love you in return. Then Aristotle goes on to say that there are three different kinds of love and since there are three kinds of love there is also three kinds of friendships.

"So there are three species of friendship, equal in number to the kinds of things that are loved; for in accordance with each, there is a reciprocal loving which one is not unaware of, and those who love one another wish for good things for one another in the same sense in which they love." (i.e. 1156a 10) The person who loves with pleasure is not actually loving the other person for who they are but loving on a basis of simply pleasure. The friendship dissolves quickly because they are friends on the basis of usefulness or pleasure. As people change through out time there is no longer feelings of pleasantness or usefulness and so the friendship does not last. To really look into this impasse Aristotle defines what a true friendship is.

Aristotle says the complete friendship are between two "people who are good and alike in virtue" (i.e. 1156b). Those people who are both good and have the same virtues are able to grow with one another bettering each other. What is good must be pleasant which in terms is loveable so this kind of friendship is the most intense and best friendship. Someone who is vicious is not a person of these attributes can truly have the best friendship with another person. Aristotle says "no one is able to spend much time with what is painful or not pleasing" (i.e 1157b) so the relationship between a vicious person would not be of the most intense friendship.

The completeness of the form of a pleasure.

Aristotle says some interesting stuff about the "completeness" of the forms of various pleasures. I didn't know quite what to make of what he was saying until I thought a bit more about it and, as usual, got a little help from Mr. Sachs. However, I may still be mistaken about the way I am reading both Sachs and Aristotle.

The first sentence of Chapter 3:

"Nor is it the case that, if pleasure is not classed among qualities, it is for that reason not among good things either; for the ways of being-at-work that belong to virtue are not qualities, and neither is happiness."

Here Aristotle seems to be saying that pleasure need not be considered among qualities. But he also doesn't seem to be ruling out the possibility that it may be a quality.

In chapter 4, he says:

"Life is a certain kind of being-at-work, and each person is at-work in connection with those things and by means of those capacities that satisfy him most...The pleasure brings the activities to completion and hence brings living to completion, which is what they all strive for." (1175a 13-19)

Now it appears that pleasure aids one's being-at-work, and vice-versa, whatever kinds they may be.

The completeness of pleasure, then, is in virtue of its being "complete in any time whatever." (1174b 5-6) As Sachs puts it in footnote 285, "The distinction is like that between extensive and intensive magnitudes; cutting a red cube in half bisects its volume and its weight, but not its redness." Thus, as it seems to me, pleasure is complete in that its quality (given in a particular being-at-work) cannot be divided. It seems that it may be diminished, as in the case of one's seeing the sun set all too often and thereby not taking as much pleasure in the sight as one once did, but the pleasure remains whole and complete in itself.

What am I even talking about? I think I know, but I'm not sure.

Self Love and True Friendship

One little thought I have about self love is this: it is so important to learn to love oneself before loving others. In my opinion, you can not learn to love anyone until you love God first. I think that by loving God, you are able to love yourself because you are a creation of Him and you are made in his image, and through that love and wisdom you are able to love others.

Another thing I have been pondering is how often one’s friendships dissolve. I didn’t really want to admit to having dissolved friendships before, however it is very true. When one changes it is most likely that the nature of the friendship will change. It might change into more of an acquaintance relationship but unless the friend makes a big change and you are making a change with the friend, you won’t be like-minded and the friendship will have a hard time surviving. I think that there are only a few friendships that will last a lifetime and that those are the “strong” friendships that Aristotle talks about. One may have many other friendships but they usually only last for a time. Friendship is used so freely in today’s age and I don’t think that people actually take the time to ponder what it means. When you go off to college you really discover who your true friends are and the others even though you may call them your friends are more like associates/acquaintances. You don’t have time to keep up with all of your friends in high school and you don’t have the energy to keep them alive, for the most part. Even though you may reunite with them over breaks and over the summer, you are just enjoying the pleasure of their presence more than the effort of your friendship. I was kind of defensive of this concept at first but as I have been in College this is one thing that I really have come to grasp.

Friendship

Friendship

These past two readings have taught me a lot about the friendships that I have and it has made me classify them into different groups. I have started to realize which of my “friends” are more of “associates or acquaintances” and which of the few friendships I have that I’ve put more effort in to without even realizing it. It has helped me to not use the word “friend” so freely because what comes in a friendship is often taken for granted or used in the wrong sense. It is important to have friends that really put effort into you and that you put effort into because the outcome is where virtue comes into play and then you carry over that virtue or beauty on others which inspires them and so forth. I have never really thought about there being “3 types of friendship before” but it really reigns true. It is interesting how one would never notice but a friendship is in existence because it is for pleasure, or for being useful, and the last is when two people wish the good for each other without any lesser motive. There is only one type of friendship (which is the 3^rd type of friendship) that isn’t fleeting or that isn’t dissolved easily and those end up being the friendships that are the most impactful and lasting on one’s life. It is interesting to ponder how a person’s friends impact the way one acts upon virtue and how they seek truth and beauty. In my case, as a devout Christian, it is important to surround myself with devout Christians who inspire my walk with God. The truth that I seek is with God and so it is important to me to have close friends that seek spiritual virtue and keep me accountable to do the same.

Goodwill

“Goodwill seems like something that has to do with friendship, though is surely not friendship, since goodwill arises toward people one does not know, and without their being aware of it, but friendship does not”(1166b 30).

In this statement, Aristotle differentiates friendship from goodwill. Although goodwill is not a bad thing, it is not equal to a friendship because it is almost like a random act of kindness. Goodwill is done for the sake of the act and the giver more so than the recipient. A friendship is created to benefit both parties involved equally.

Moreover, the way that Aristotle describes goodwill leads me to believe that, in a way, it could be abused (then, of course, it is questionable as to whether or not it is actually goodwill anymore). Since it involves complete strangers, it seems that one could use goodwill as a means to boost their public reputation. This ulterior motive is additional to the original intentions of goodwill (which are kindness towards others and therefore a better feeling of oneself), and therefore tarnishes the act. This will not result in an honest act of goodwill or the beginning of a true friendship, which, according to Aristotle, begins with goodwill. If goodwill is done to improve ones reputation, then that sets forth a false front when seeking friendship.

Why so much about friends?

I was thinking today as i wrote my final, what the importance of friendship is? I mean obviously Aristotle thought they mattered quite a bit, since he wrote two books on them. But what does this mean for us today? It is my person belief that in our culture we don't put as much emphasis on friendship as we probably should. This could be why it seems odd to us his stipulations for a true friendship. But it does seem that everybody has at least has one true friend as aristotle says it. So maybe in our american culture we try to have too many friends? We are somewhat of people pleasers at the heart of it, and so we want more than one or two "true friends" but as Aristotle puts it that is basically impossible. It seems if we came to grips with that then we would be able to much better understand, and accept, what it is that Aristotle says about true friendship.

Are Friends Needed When Happy?

In Chapter 9 of Book 9, Aristotle brings up the issue of happiness and friendship, "It is also a matter of dispute whether someone who is happy needs friends or not." He frames his question right before 1169b 10, "Therefore, 'when destiny provides well, why does one need friends?'"

If one has been blessed with good things, then friends of use and pleasure will be of no need to the blessed person. For they will already have useful and pleasure things, and only have a need for friends of good. That is if they have not been corrupted. If one has been blessed with good things, yet is corrupted, then there is the possibility of them becoming filled with greed and want more and more things of use and of pleasure. This would lead to them acquiring more and more friends of use and of pleasure that do no good for the blessed person.

Aristotle states right before 1169b 20, "And perhaps it is absurd to make the blessed person solitary, since no one would choose to have all good things by himself, for a human being is meant for a city and is of such a nature as to live with others." Before I read this I had thought that it was the unhappy person that needs friends and the happy person does not. But after reading this it just makes sense that a happy person needs friends just as much as an unhappy person needs friends. For if a virtuous person has been blessed, then they will need friends in order for them to share their blessings with, friends to give and do favorable acts to. As Aristotle says at 1169b 10, "And if it belongs to a friend to do good more than to receive it, and doing good for others belongs to a good person and to VIRTUE." The more someone is blessed does not equal the more virtuous they are. It is what they do with their blessings that determine how virtuous they are. A blessed person has to have friends if they are striving for a beautiful end; for they must have friends that they can do favoring, good, and virtuous acts towards. As Aristotle said in Book 8, "For no one would choose to live without friends, despite having all the rest of the the good things."

Making at-work

In Book XI, Aristotle discusses friendship. I see a strong connection between friendship and happiness (eudaimonia), the latter of which he says is the best way of being-at-work, with the apparent additional need of external goods (1099a 30-34). He compares friendship to artisanship in that a true friend does good things for the other, in which case the other is the friend's work, as an artisan does good things for his art, in which case the art is the artisan's work (1168a 3-5). The connection that I see between friendship and happiness (eudaimonia) consists in the notions of being and making. Friendship seems to be a requisite for happiness because it reflects one's being-at-work in accordance with virtue, or in some way acts as the medium for being-at-work.

My idea that friendship is a requisite for happiness for Aristotle is derived from his explanation of friendship as it relates to being-at-work: "...we are by being-at-work (since it is by living and acting), and the work is, in a certain way, its maker at-work; so he loves the work because he also loves to be." What I find interesting about this expression is that he seems to suggest that one who is being-at-work in accordance with virtue has the power to make at-work in accordance with virtue. If I am reading Aristotle correctly, such an idea would be greatly important for understanding this notion of making as it relates to metaphysics.

The difference between venting and searching for advice.

In our last class, the topic of venting was some what of a major focus. Many people in the class , myself included, initially held reservations about whether or not venting has negative affects on relationships or is simply a way for people to discuss and relate their days. After our discussion, I can admit that I often over-vent, and believe that while venting allows people to get things off their chest, it has the potential to deteriorate relationships overtime. This is something that I feel Aristotle would agree with for he states "Friendship arises less among people of sour disposition and among those who are older, to the extent that they are harder to get along with and take less pleasure in company"(1158a 30). As in if you are constantly complaining about your day, it is less likely that people will want to become friends with you.

However, What about asking for advice? It seems that is not detrimental to establishing relationships for asking for advice is an expression of trust, trust in one's ability to council someone properly. The difference between venting and searching for advice is that in that in the act of venting, one doesn't care what the other person thinks. The "friend" is merely being used.

Too Many Friends

In book nine and part of book eight, Aristotle declares, “To be a friend to many people in the complete kind of friendship is not possible” (1158a 10).

I guess we must first look at what Aristotle means by complete friendship. Well we know that friendship is an active condition of the soul and Joe Sachs describes it in footnote 260 that the life of friendship seems to be “an expansion of the soul instead of a contraction of communal life.” Aristotle calls truly loving too many people an “extreme condition” (1158a 10). So if a true friendship is an expansion of our soul and when we gain too many friends, we move from an active condition to an extreme condition, then Aristotle must be correct in saying that one can have too many friends.

Aristotle also says “the friend is another self” (1166a 30). This means that we find likeness in their thinking, virtue, etc. So how many selves can we actually have? Besides, Aristotle says that it’s “not easy even for there to be many good people to be pleased by.” In other words, true virtue is rare and there are probably not even enough good people to have an excess of friends or that will be like us. So when people claim to have many friends, these are just familiar acquaintances, lacking the depth and virtue of a true friendship.

Friendship in a Community

In Book 8, Aristotle made it very clear that the most complete type of friendship is one between people who are good and alike in virtue. "But the complete sort of friendship is that between people who are good and are alike in virtue, since they wish for good things for one another in the same way insofar as they are good, and they are good in themselves" Chapter 3, 1156b 10. Therefore, friendships based on pleasure or use are of lesser value. "So those who love one another for what is useful do not love one another for themselves, but insofar as something good comes to them from one another. And it is similar with those who love on account of pleasure, since they are fond of charming people not for being people of a certain sort, but because they are pleasing to themselves" Chapter 3, 10.

Now in regards to a community, like a large nation, friendship of the good is basically impossible on a large scale. This leaves the friendships of use and pleasure, the ones that you do not want to strive for, the only types to strive for. This is not as bad as one might think. For instance, if a large nation is under siege, not every soldier is going to have a friendship of the good with their comrades. They will, or should, have a friendship of use and pleasure with all of their comrades. Their friendships are ones of use and pleasure because all of the soldiers use each other in order to defend their nation, with the goal of having pleasure in victory. The downside is if the soldiers fail at defending their nation, their friendship of use and pleasure is shot to pieces, along with many other things. The upside is if they survive and successfully defend their nation, the soldiers' friendship can easily become a friendship of the good. What started out as a friendship based on use and pleasure for the sake of their nation between soldiers, can lead to a lifelong friendship of the good.

Friendship/ Marriage

The question that was asked in class was if friendship was based on similarity or differences. I feel that marriage is a different type of friendship, but some people say that marriages work oppositely, as in the opposites attract. I was wondering if anyone could explain this because in class I felt like we came to a conclusion that true friendship is based upon similarities. To go out to eat, you would need to like the same food, to go shopping together, you would need to have the same styles, and to have reasonable conversations and not come across arguments, you would need to have the same ideas and morals. So maybe the saying that opposites attract is just a silly saying that isn't true..?

We also talked about the disproportion of love may work for some people, but would this be a form of "true love"? What I have come to realize is that people always want what they cannot have. Not trying to bash boys, but in my personal experience, it has always been a boy! If this remains true in relationships, then the relationship will either stay unbalanced, which may lead to an unhealthy relationship, or the higher person in the relationship will finally give the lower person what he/she wants and then once the lower person has what they want, they will become uninterested. If that is the case then maybe it could be considered a friendship, but not in the truest form. In the conclusion, I am not sure if I agree that a disproportional relationship could work, or at least stay healthy. Maybe it's an exception not the rule, but it is definitely something I have wondered even before we talked about it in class.

On Social Contract

Aristotle in Book VIII discusses the importance of friendship within a society and asserts that those in a society must be friends for that society to succeed. He states that “when people are friends there is no need of justice, but when they are just there is still need of friendship” (VIII, 1155a, 26-27). Friendship acts as a replacement for justice in lasting societies, so that it becomes an alternative mechanism of equity. I have mixed feelings about his assertion.

First, I do believe that some sort of friendship must be necessary in these societies because justice alone will not motivate the people to act properly toward one another, except for fear of punishment. After all, as Barry Goldwater once said, “you can’t legislate morality.” A city of friends will be more peaceful, more equal, and more stable because the citizens respect the laws that are made by one another.

However, I do not think that it is necessary to have true friendship; but instead, a friendship of use will suffice for as long as the city exists. There are three reasons that people make a political union: fear of loss (having property/life unprotected), anticipation of gain (as in closer trade), or by the force of a higher power. The first two of these will form a social contract among the members for the good of all. This is made, in my opinion, out of selfish reasons and a friendship of use. Because the “use” of protection and wealth applies to all parties somewhat equally, the society will last peaceably. Everyone’s selfish interests for a blend of liberty and security work together to form one, common system of laws for the good of all. Although there is a benefit for all parties, that benefit to one’s countrymen is just a byproduct of personal benefits. This union is only a friendship of use that is relatively stable because the uses of safety, wealth, and defense in a society do not ever disappear. Thus, true friendship based on virtue is probably not necessary for this type of political union.

Book 5 Chapter 5 (Rewind)

Relating back to Chapter 5 in Book 5, I kind of wanted to touch on how interesting the topic of money is and how its brought into account within this text. It’s hard for me to bring up questions or to write a super interesting blog because I am just blogging about what sparked my interest. A lot of material in Aristotle is kind of hard to understand but the concept of exchange and fair exchange and how currency comes into play really makes sense. I never contemplated how currency came to be in this greek society but I love the process in which it is described. It is interesting that it all started with the exchanging for the equality of goods. Back then one would trade 6 pairs of shoes and get a house in return because the shoe maker needs a house and the house-builder needs shoes. This was a fair trade. Times have changed drastically, obviously, and now I don’t think that people are as concerned with the equality of the trade rather they are concerned with the money/profit that they are making and how competitive they can make their business. It all started out with equality and now equality doesn’t even seem to fit in the picture at all.

Can anyone live without friends and have a fulfilled life?

In book VII, Chapter 1, Aristotle says, "It would follow, after these things, to go through what concerns a friendship, since it is a certain kind of virtue, or goes with virtue, and is also most necessary for life. For no one would choose to live without friends, despite having all the rest of the good things...." Of course friends are good to have around for multiple reasons; they are to protect your prosperity and are there to help you in good times and rough times as well. They are also there to benefit from your prosperity, we give to friends in order to increase our noble actions. I found it interesting that Aristotle included many relationships including parent to child and business acquaintances, so it is not just the traditional friends that we all might think. There is always a big disagreement it seems when it comes to friendships. Some people think that friends are a requirement of a fulfilled life, but others may think that friendship is also a worthy pursuit in itself. People that have lots of friends and are good to them are said to be praised. Another big disagreement among people is that of who really makes a good friend, those who are similar or who are opposite from you? There are just so many questions when it comes to friends: (How many should you have, what kind) and who can be friends (good or bad, or one of each)? So my question is a simple question; Can anyone live without friends and have a fulfilled life? I am just not sure about this...I think that some people are introverted and don't have friends to a degree and live a happy life and are happy with what they do and who they are, and someone is going to tell me that even though they are happy their life is not fulfilled? I find this topic interesting yet sticky in a since that their will never be a mutual agreement among everyone about these kinds of questions.

Animal like vs. disease state

I have often lately pondered on the idea of what is the animal like state, and the disease state. It seems to me that when in the heat of there vices the two look very very similar. But what is the difference. To me it seems that the difference is at the root of what causes them. For the disease like state, the cause could be an illness or a brain problem. This in my opinion is not the fault of the person. However the question i suppose i pose in this blog post is, is the lack of upbringing that thus causes the animal like state the fault of the person, or people who raised the said person? It is my personal belief that it is not the fault of the infected person.

The Source

In Book Seven, Chapter Eight, while Aristotle is talking about temperance and dissipation, there was a passage he said that really stuck out to me and was really profound. A little after 1151a 10, Aristotle says, "For virtue keeps the source safe, while vice destroys it, and in actions the source is that for the sake of which one acts, just as in mathematics the sources are the hypotheses; so neither there nor here is reason able to teach anyone the sources, but here it is virtue, either natural or habituated, that directs one to right opinion about the source."

We have been discussing virtue ever since reading Meno, but this passage by Aristotle seems to really hammer the point home. The idea that it is virtue that keeps the source/the good/the truth/the beautiful safe and when we act, we act (if we are wanting to be virtuous) as a byproduct of the source/the good/the truth/the beautiful is a very powerful concept. And if one can take that to heart, and not let vice destroy the source; one would live a virtuous life that ends with a beautiful end. In regards to the last part; if virtue keeps the source safe and the source is why one acts, then it makes since then that virtue, by nature, leads people to the true source. However, the phrase, "so neither there nor here is reason able to teach anyone the sources" does not seem to work. This might just be nitpicking, but it seems as if reason could play a role in teaching about the sources. If virtue is something that can be "natural or habituated, that directs one to the right opinon about the source" then could reason be something that helps habituate one to become virtuous; and therefore play a role in teaching one about the right source? Either way, the crucial role that virtue has in dealing with the source is too important not to apply to one's journey towards a beautiful end.

Clarification between animal and man

One of the constant questions that I have had since this class began is how animals fit into this picture of reasoning and how they differ from humans; even though we are animals too. Originally I would have said that animals do have practical judgement and that a humans viewpoint of what reasoning is goes against nature. But after further review it seems that human reasoning is just more in-depeth and therefore not against nature but different because of our use of actions instead of just sense stimuli.
With that being said I still can't shake the suspicion that some animals may reason much more than we expect. Because in the end reasoning can not be observed and it is only by observation and communication that we try to differentiate between what is simply reaction to sensation and what is reasoning.

Book V

In class, we discussed the possibility of being unjust to one’s self. Some people thought that it was possible, while others did not. A reason that someone could be unjust to one’s self is by taking smaller than one’s share to the point of harm, therefore being unjust to one’s self. This person is not to be confused with the person who is not only just, but also descent by taking less than his or her share. I, however, disagree and think that it is impossible to be unjust to one’s self. In chapter one, Aristotle says, “This sort of justice, then, is complete virtue, though not simply but in relation to someone else.” From my understanding of this quote, justice is unlike other virtues because instead of dealing with the individual, justice must deal with more than one person because it is in relation with someone else.

Forms of Non-Courage and Military Draft

While reading about the five types of non-courage, I thought about the implement of military draft and what category soldiers under this command would fall into. But, I began to think that drafted soldiers do not fall into any particular one of these necessarily (although in a way it could fall in with the condition that comes from citizenship).They could likely fit into the group of those who are at sea or have diseases (1115a 30) because they like the sailors or disease-ridden, they realize that the situation of war is out of their own control and therefore must make the most of it. Despite the war examples Aristotle uses to better articulate the non-courage forms, I think the issue of drafting is not addressed by experience, spiritedness, hope, or ignorance.

Hope and Ignorance

In class we discussed different ways people can seem courageous (but are, in fact, not truly courageous). While reading I stumbled while trying to differentiate the case of a person who is full of hope and the case of a person who is ignorant. I want to break down each case to examine their differences.

"Nor are those who are full of hope courageous, since it is on account of having been victorious often over many people that they are confident in dangerous situations; but they are much like courageous people, since both are confident, but while courageous people are confident on account of what was said above, these people are so from believing they will be the strongest and will suffer nothing." --1117a:10
Someone is full of hope is the same as a courageous person in two ways: they each have prior victories that add to their confidence (which makes sense), and that both have confidence enough to meet their opposition. The biggest difference is that people who are full of hope believe there will be no negative consequences. To quote Dr. Davis' example, a soldier who is full of hope will flee upon seeing one of their own perish on the battlefield, because the realization comes to them that there is a possibility of death.

"Those who are ignorant also appear to be courageous, and are not far from those who are full of hope, but they are worse to the extent that they have nothing they consider worth facing." --1117a20
Aristotle goes on to talk about "those who are deceived," which one can only assume is referring to people that are ignorant. The ignorant are oblivious to certain aspects of their opposition. For example, one who is ignorant of their opponents strength will believe they have the upper hand, until they discover that they are, in fact, on par with or weaker than the opposition, and will promptly flee when this is discovered.

So, it can be said that one identifiable difference between those who are ignorant and those who are full of hope is the difference in what they are unaware of; an ignorant person is unaware of what he faces or what the strength of his opposition is, and a hopeful person is unaware of these things in relation to themselves, like being unaware of their own strength.

Beautiful End

“Courage is a beautiful thing, and so its end is something beautiful as well, since each thing is determined by its end” (1115b 20).

Aristotle defines courage by addressing what it is not. In each example, Aristotle seems to be stressing the importance of both, what a person is running to and how they are getting there, as a way to determine true courage or virtue. The final destination is obviously the beautiful end being sought after and the way of getting there is the motivation or means. While citizenship may appear courageous and the means virtuous, the end to which a person seeks is compliance with the law and avoidance of consequence. Therefore, citizenship’s end is not beautiful, so citizenship itself cannot be beautiful and consequently, it cannot be courage. The same goes for Aristotle’s other examples. Spiritedness is motivated by impulse, which is in discord with reason and therefore not something beautiful. Hope is motivated by false confidence. Ignorance is in obvious opposition to courage because those who are ignorant do not even have a beautiful end to seek. So before reading this passage, I believe most of us, including myself, would have defined courage as the absence of fear in the face of danger. However, after Aristotle looks at true courage, we see that courage is actually a proportionate response to fear by facing a dangerous situation for its beautiful end. Courage “chooses something and endures it because it is a beautiful thing” (1116a 10).

The Scents of Sauce and Prey

In Chapter 10 of Book III, Aristotle decides that temperance must have to do with bodily pleasures. But not those related to sight or hearing, because people do not speak of those who delight too much in the pleasures associated with sight or hearing as dissipated (1118a: 2-6). Yet with regards to smell, there are scents that he thinks remind one of "things they yearn for," such as sauces (reminds one of food) (1118a: 12-14). What follows from taking delight in such scents is a growth in the associated desire.

For instance, the scent of BBQ sauce makes me hungry. Sometimes when I smell BBQ sauce, I wish that I could be eating something with BBQ sauce on it instead of just smelling the BBQ sauce. Is it likely that if I indulged in satisfying my desire to eat something with BBQ sauce on it more frequently, then the delight that comes from smelling BBQ sauce will be greater and thus my desire for ingesting BBQ sauce?

Aristotle does not believe that animals take pleasure in sight, sound, or smell, "except incidentally." (1118a: 18-19) What is odd about his claims about animals is that he does not think that meat-eating animals take pleasure in the smell of their prey, nor in the sight of their prey, nor in the sound of their prey. I wonder if his claim still holds up in modern science. It seems strange to claim that meat-eating animals take pleasure in eating meat (like humans) but do not share the pleasure associated with the scent of food with humans. Based on my own experience, I think dogs react differently to the sight of something they might like to eat than they do to the scent of something they might like to eat, but maybe it is not a pleasurable experience although their behavior suggests otherwise.

Wishers Can't Be Choosers

While reading Book III, I found an interesting statement by Aristotle in regard to the nature of happiness. He states that “we wish to be happy and say so, while it would not fit the meaning to say we choose to be happy, since, universally, choice seems to be concerned with things that are up to us” (Ch. 2; 29-31). My first observation was that his point seems to clearly contradict some ideas regarding the state of one’s emotions, namely those who say that a person chooses to be happy or content in a situation. However, I followed along and agreed to his conclusion mainly on the grounds that I did not know it would become such an issue later. After all, here his definition of “wishing” would make the acquisition of happiness a wish since it is aimed at an end rather than a means to achieve that end.

However, as I continued, I found what appeared to be at least a slight contradiction in his reasoning. In Chapter 5, Aristotle states that “to say that no one is willingly wretched or unwillingly happy seems to be partly false and partly true, for no one is happy unwillingly, but baseness is something willing” (15-17). I have a feeling that I am only getting caught in a trap of semantics here and that there is really no problem of contradiction, despite my possible disagreement with his initial assertion. This last statement was made to support his belief that choices are either virtuous or vicious; the final product of happiness would not be a choice, but instead, an end reached through virtuous choices. Meanwhile, baseness would derive from vicious choices.

Then I understand what Aristotle means by his statement that “one cannot choose to be happy” since one chooses the things that will make him happy, but not the act of happiness itself. It does make sense technically then. One cannot choose to be in a certain state but only scenarios that would place them in that state. For instance, I would not choose to be wealthy, but instead choose to follow a career that would make me wealthy.

Non-Willing

A large portion of class today was spent defining actions that Aristotle titles "non-willing". Now several assumptions of what this term may mean were discussed in class, but the only clear-cut difference between "non-willing" and "unwilling" that Aristotle provides is that those who are "non-willing" do not feel it necessary to repent for their actions unlike the "unwilling" . The most notable possibility that we came up with was the example of someone who was so intoxicated that they forgot all of their negative actions and therefore could not feel remorse or repent for them. While, I think this example has the potential to meet the terms of "non-willing". I do think that everyone if put in this situation would feel incapable of repentance. I think that some would do more than make to not become intoxicated again but also make up for whatever mistakes they unknowingly made while intoxicated. Also, it seems possible to be "non-willing" in other ways besides be intoxicated for Aristotle makes the comment that anger has the potential to produce "non-willing" actions. As I see it the only negative actions that constitute the term "non-willing" are those that are done in some state where one gives up control of the rational part of their soul and after later realizing their mistakes blame the state in which they were in and not themselves. An example being someone who in gives into impulse and attacks someone blames their temper and then later does nothing to repent. Perhaps, I am confused but the lack of clarity in this section is uncharacteristic of the rest of the Nicomachean ethics thus far.

Opinions and Choices

In class today we talked about how it’s not our opinions who make us who we are, but it’s our choices. This is something that I have had a problem with lately, and I think it is really neat that we ended up talking about it in our philosophy class. Who knew? It is human nature to be judgmental, no matter who you are you are going to judge a person whether you speak it out loud or not. Sometimes I have problems with judging people on their opinions about things; even when I know that I should be respectful about other people’s opinions, I try to go out of the way to end the conversation just so I don’t have to listen anymore because I get so frustrated inside with what they are saying.

When I was listening in class I found that if you truly want to get to know someone, do not base it off of their opinions, but base it off of their stories because it is our choices that matter. It is our choices that shape who we are and what we will become. Needless to say, today was a good day in philosophy class, especially if we get participation points for watching the wasps!

Virture of Character

In the beginning of Chapter 9 in Book Two, Aristotle states, "It has been said sufficiently, then, that virtue of character is a mean condition, and in what way, namely because it is a mean between two kinds of vice, the one resulting from excess and the other from deficiency, and that it is such a mean condition on account of being apt to hit the mean in feelings and actions." This seems to be a fair explanation of what virtue is. This also suggests that going too far towards deficiency or too far towards excess is not being the most virtuous. I would agree on the first part about going too far towards deficiency would result in a lack of virtue and would not be something worth striving for. However, I don't agree with the latter - that going too far towards excess would be an inordinate amount of virtue and would be something not worth striving for (given that virtue is a means between the two vices). While an over-excess in many things can become destructive (excess desires of food, etc.), I think virtue is something different. It seems reasonable that you would want to be virtuous in excess (all the way) then be in the middle of the two vices. The more virtue you have, even in excess, the better.

Is pleasure happyness?

It seems that earlier in the book it talks about whether or not pleasure as being happy. But this seems an odd question because we haven't even defined pleasure, or being happy. I would like to things that made you happy would also please you. If that makes any since tell me, if not i understand. It just seems to me that if you are doing things that are of the good then you would take pleasure in them and be happy.

Remarks to Book 3

"In general, choice seems to relate to the things that are in our power. By choosing what is good or bad we are men of a certain character, which we are not by holding certain opinions." Our character is determined by our choices, not by our opinions I feel. "The object of choice being one of the things in our own power which is desired after deliberation, choice will be deliberate desire of things in our own power; for when we have reached a judgement as a result of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our deliberation." We decide what to choose after deliberating and the choice then is our desire I feel. "To the unjust and the self-indulgent men it was open at the beginning not to become men of this kind, and so they are unjust and self-indulgent voluntarily; but now that they have become so it is not possible for them not to be so. But not only are the vices of the soul voluntary, but those of the body also for some men, whom we accordingly blame." The bad man becomes bad by choice and then finds it impossible to shed the bad habits. I also think that we are good or bad by choice and we are not born that way. We make the decisions which can alter our lives and can ultimately lead to good or bad things.

Good Artisan = Good Man?

In Chapter 4 of Book II in Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says something interesting about the relationship between knowledge and action.

He claims that all that is necessary for the artisan is "the mere knowing." (1105b: 2) But the virtuous man, he must act "knowingly," and have chosen the action "for [its] own sake," and must be "in a stable condition and not able to be moved all the way out of it." (1105a: 32-35)

I am confused about why he thinks there is an actual distinction between what constitutes a good artisan and what constitutes a good man. Does it not make sense to say that an artisan must be just? For he must also be a man, and a businessman at that. Virtue seems requisite for any social behavior to be deemed "good" or "just". Am I missing something crucial about what Aristotle is really saying about this distinction?

The restrained vs. the unrestrained

In our last class, someone brought up the question of whether or not "the restrained" are truly better than the "unrestrained" on the basis that restrained may have not committed a crime but they still harbor the desire to while "the unrestrained" may have committed the offense but feel a deep sense of remorse. While each of us can probably find a situation where this seems true. It seems simple enough to argue that it is not because in the case of "the restrained", no one and nothing but the soul within in the "the restrained" is effected. Furthermore, the guilt that is placed on the soul of "the unrestrained" after a given crime would likely equal or surpass the conflict of "the restrained's" soul. In terms of the reading, it is important to mention that Aristotle would argue this for "the restrained" are an example of a the rational parts of the soul being in control which is key to becoming virtuous. Though this soul is not acting out of virtue, the action is a step towards virtue, likewise much of book two centers on this idea of moral virtue being established by continual practice, further proving the importance of "the restrained" to remain so.

Ill take Business Ethics for $600

Ethics is a very nice change from all of Socrates' forms. It starts with a very nice opener that says good is that at which all things aim. Already im thinking alright, sweet maybe ill figure out what this good is and if i can ever find some somewhere. Aristotle has a nice way of speaking that doesnt seem to dwell on anything for too long, or go off on random notes that usually dont lead anywhere. He says the good of a person is nice, but the good of a city is divine and by nature, political...sounds familiar. Many of the passages are conclusive, which i appreciated. He shows how skewed peoples' views on happiness can be by saying many people have different views on it, and often the same person can have different views on it, as if it is a flucuating thing. We do actually get a good version of happiness and the good. Happiness is virtue-ing. To be happy is to practice whatever virtue sums you as a person. It is an active thing that in essence is somebody performing to their best abilities. Why are their so many unhappy people in the world? Well, its because UPS delivery doesnt require bravery.

Book 10

Book ten begins with Socrates' thoughts on imitation. He uses forms, as usual, for his examples. Couches and chairs are created by couch and chair makers who know the essence of a couch or chair. Ill buy it. He wonders if painters paint what is or what looks. He concludes that a painter's craft is far from truth because he only imitates what something looks like. This brings us to the second conclusion that imitation is far from truth. We then go off on a tangent about Homer and whether he is as near what is, or the truth, as people say. Socrates points out that if Homer were really capable of knowing rather than imitating as the painter does he would have had much more success in his own time. In the middle of book ten he says, "one must accept the fall of the dice and settle one's affairs accordingly." This struck me when i first read it. It goes along fine from the viewpoint of a man trying to govern a city, but i read from the position of a citizen, who by nature must question what happens. Accepting how the dice falls is what the people of Germany did in WWII. I say the dice may fall one way, but you can always roll a second hand. Of course, Socratese was referring to a man who has had some certain misfortune, like the death of the son, in which case there is no second chance. He says that a strong man of virtue will grieve, but will also not hold on to the pain.

Pleasures vs. Happiness

“So the life these people lead has no additional need of pleasure as a sort of appendage, but has its pleasure in itself” (1099a 10).

Aristotle is very specific when he talks about pleasures. I feel like we used the term too loosely in class, calling pleasures sleeping in or eating more than necessary when in fact pleasures are encompassed in our natural necessities and consequently, virtue. Pleasures are in accordance with “the good.” Now even though this good cannot be clearly defined, we know from other philosophical works that it includes moderation and rational thought. These excessive things that we think are pleasures and balance our soul by feeding desires are actually, “in conflict with one another” (1099a 10). This all relates back to harmony within the soul. In addition, when we think of pleasures as fleeting moments of enjoyment that make us happy, we are making happiness a temporary feeling rather than what Aristotle is referring to as a state of mind or overall achievement for a human life or soul. However, I don’t think we can clearly define these pleasures at this point in the book. We must first understand what happiness is before we define these components.

Aristotle on Politics

“And it would seem to belong to the one that is most governing and most a master are, and politics appears to be of this sort, since it prescribes which kinds of knowledge ought to be in the cities, and what sorts each person ought to learn and to what extent; also, we see that the most honored capacities, such as generalship, household economics, and rhetorical skill, are under this one” (1094a 28-1094b 4) Aristotle’s words may surprise or disgust some readers. However, the proposition is appealing when one examines the “political life.”

We must first remember that Aristotle lived and wrote in the Athenian democracy, where civic duty was highly valued. Men like himself, virtual Renaissance men of their day (had the Renaissance occurred by that point, of course), met at the gates of the city to discuss and debate, eventually transferring these plans to the governmental circle and using them to better the lives of the population. Even Socrates, who refused to enter formal politics, valued civic discussion. In fact, as we all know, Plato (via Socrates) attempted to form the government that would create the most just population.

Socrates’ points about the soul and its effect on the city are also valid in describing Aristotle’s opinion. Just as a certain type of man would be reflected in a certain government (aristocratic man to aristocracy, timocratic to timocracy, etc), the just man would reflect justice in his political action. After all, Aristotle, in The Politics, states that justice is man’s salvation, and that it “belongs to the polis; for justice...is an ordering of the political association” (1253 a 20-22). Since people naturally must live in a society and societies must have some rule of law, than the political life is one that completes the life of others. It is human management, and it both reflects the manager and the populous whose life is bettered by his actions.

Finally, the political life allows man to receive the greatest of human accomplishments, honor, while also exercising the greatest of human abilities, reason. Therefore, it will yield some level of happiness in the soul. At the same time, it is used to affect and improve the lives of one’s countrymen through the determination and administration of justice, thus yielding happiness in the whole of society.

Happiness from Descendants

In chapter 11 of book 1 in Nic. Ethics, Aristotle addresses the notion of descendents affecting one’s happiness. I agree with Aristotle’s argument that “when friends of the departed fare well, and likewise when they fare badly, this has an influence on those who are departed, but of such a kind and amount as neither to make the happy not be happy nor anything else of the sort.” (1101 b).

The happiness of a person is dependent upon said person, not the actions of others around them, or those who descend from them. Happiness as it is used in this context is a state of life that can only be judged upon one’s death. But, once the happiness of a person’s life has been assessed, it cannot be changed by honor or disgrace from others.

The public reputation of a family may be helped or harmed, but as stated in book 9 of the Republic, this would only satisfy the honor-loving person, not the truth-seeking one who is ultimately the just one. Therefore, it is not necessary for a son to seek out virtuosity in order to maintain the honor of a departed predecessor. This neither affects the departed’s happiness nor assures happiness for the son who is seeking honor for the sake of others.

No such thing as selflessness

In Chapter Two Book I of Aristotle's Ethics there is a line that basically says that achieving "the good" for a people people (or city) is greater or more divine than it is for an individual. First, I don't see how if the individual and the cities goods are the same that the cities could be greater. The city is just a collection of indivuals trying to pursue their goals that will allow them happiness. The only logical way I can see the happiness of a city as greater is that if the result of the individual's work that is happiness did not depend on doing the work. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the reason people derive happiness from work is from the satisfaction they get from doing it. I would argue that all of the work and happiness is based on selfish sastisfaction. Even self-sacrifice is a form of selfishness in that it is done in the name of the things that the sacrificer holds important. These efforts may be beneficial to the community but on a deeper level all actions are selfish because individuals derive happiness from them. Therefore, the communities happiness may seem more divine or greater only because the structure of a community allows for individuals to accomplish their selfish little goals. I see how the idea of greater community seems appealing however it is an illusion and should be viewed for what it really is, a collection of selfish people at opposition with one another.

Nic Ethics Book 1

This Chapter brings up several features of Aristotle's thought in general. First of all, he insists in seeking out precision in an inquiry only within the limits set by the nature of the inquiry itself. Therefore while one should expect perfect precision in a subject like mathematics, one should not expect ethics to be so exact, or doubt the validity of conclusions about ethics because their precision is not at the level of mathematical precision. Second, the idea that a person needs to be virtuous in order to understand ethics is an important feature in Aristotle's argument. Studying ethics requires the use of practical reason and ought to result in actions that accord with ethical principles. If a person does not live virtuously, his reason is not disposed to accept the logic of ethical arguments and is even less disposed to put ethical principles into action, which is an imperative of practical reason. Finally Plato considers the only true Good to be the universal form which exists only in the realm of ideas, Aristotle rejects Plato's characterization. Aristotle thinks that good is the end of human action in general and should therefore have practical ramifications for the way a person should act.

In Response to Mr. Davidson's "America"

Socrates would be one among many who would not have "enough faith in people to act virtuously by themselves." This belief might actually point to why humans first formed societies out of a state of nature. For it's possible that Thomas Hobbes was right when he said something like this: the state of nature is a state of war with all against all. Thus it is a disputable claim to say that savages (that is, uncivilized people) could produce more justice in their own "Savage [according to Hobbes, inevitably war-torn] Society" than we 21st century folk have produced in our nearly global society.

With regards to whether Socrates believes "this system [do you mean the American political system or the Athenian?] causes people to focus their souls on lesser things than virtue,": Socrates maintains that Athenian democracy (if not American democracy) produces wealth and decadent lifestyles and thus people who are pleasure-seekers over virtue-seekers. The Sophists (educated men; rhetoricians, orators) appealed greatly to the pleasure-seekers and claimed to be ones themselves because they believed that it produces happiness or, as Plato really means it, eudaimonia, which essentially means a "good life". Socrates did not think much of Pericles, who he believed to have procured the Athenians wealth and luxury. Yet it seems to me that if he thinks these things about his own society and ours is also a form of democracy, then he might think the same things about ours. If, of course, as Mr. Davidson said, "he were able to," and he simply researched global consumption and credit card debt statistics, it is possible that he might make that conclusion without even needing to know that we are in fact a democratic society.

The Henry Ward Beecher quote is certainly poetic, but what does he mean by "long breath" in relation to every aspect that is important to the modern world when determining the policies and structure of a state? Knowing what would be necessary in order to know what he thinks the bounds of one's liberty ought to be in the modern world. For I assume that Mr. Davidson takes the quote to be relevant to the modern world, which is why he thinks that it "sums it up nicely."

Myth of Er

To me, I think Socrates closed the discussion in the Republic with the Myth of Er to provoke one to think about the afterlife. With the whole book being about justice and relating that with a city and the soul, I think it was a brilliant way to close the discussion. The Myth of Er allows one to think about how they are living their life, and if they are living a just life. It enables us to ponder our life and evaluate how we are living day to day. If our actions decide what happens in the afterlife, the Myth of Er encourages all of us to be as just as we can in this lifetime and do everything we can to achieve harmony in our soul.

Feeding the soul.

In The Republic, Socrates talks a lot about the elimination and filtering of poetry and music. Personally i believe this would go against what he has written earlier about harmony in the soul. It seem like it would not feel the portion that needs art and expression. This would cause suppression in the soul and cause harmony not to be in the soul, and therefor not in the society. But is this part of art and expression really needed in the soul.

Book X

In book X, Socrates banishes poets from the city, but afterwards offers room for a reasonable argument to take place to allow poets back into the city. Although this is not a valid argument, I have been thinking about this in my head. Poetry is seen to weaken us because it is on the emotional side. And if the people who are driven by their emotions lack reason, then Socrates would be right in not letting them in his city. It has been a while, but if I remember correctly, then it is just the guards that Socrates wanted to protect from crying too much, laughing uncontrollably, or just being too emotional in general. If that is the case, I do not see why the common people wouldn’t be allowed to read or write poetry. Arts help express one’s self and define their personality, and I do not feel that it would be possible to keep that out of a city.

America

Book IX seems to be the most straightforward and perhaps one of the most thought-provoking books of the Republic. This book clearly discusses the various political systems and Socrates beliefs about what effect each has on the soul. Not to mention it provides a fantastic response on why it is better to be just and outwardly suffering than to be completely unjust but physically fine.

In this book Socrates also criticizes the democracy. As someone who has grown up on the principle of freedom, this is obviously something that I can't easily agree with. But the Democracy that Socrates describes is what we would consider anarchy or rule by the mob. While agree this style of government or lack of government can only lead to misery it something that is all together different than the American political system. So how exactly is the American political system different? Well, through class discussion it became apparent that the American political System combines aspects of all the political systems described by Socrates. We have system of checks and balances that curtail the power of anyone individual. Our politicians typically come from well-eduacted backgrounds and our schools and churches at least we hope provide people with a sense of right and wrong. Despite the fact this system seems to deter tyranny, I think if Socrates were able to he would think this system causes people to focus their souls on lesser things than virtue, but frankly I after fully reading this book I feel Socrates has not enough faith in people to act virtuously by themselves and the level of control he believes necessary to create a "Just" city comes at to high of a price. It is hard to articulate this in a short blog but I think Harry Ward Beecher sums it up pretty nicely "Liberty is the soul's right to breathe, and when it cannot take a long breath laws are girded too tight".

Freedom in the Soul

In America, we live in a society that prides itself on freedom. We value our ability to essentially do whatever we want within the law. We see this freedom as the best possible condition for the soul—letting it roam free to pursue any or all of its desires. However, when Socrates puts this scenario in the perspective of the city and its rulers, freedom appears in a different light. When ranking the superior kinds of rulers for the city, Socrates places the democracy near the bottom, claiming that freedom makes a man thirst for unnecessary desires that go beyond moderation. He says that men are “too soft to resist pleasures and pains, and too idle” (556b). Socrates claims that, “each man would organize his life in it privately just as it pleases him” (557b). On the outside, this city may look fair but Socrates reveals that this dissension within the soul—its pursuit of unnecessary desires in addition to the actual needs of the soul—is an unhealthy state. This illusion of freedom actually chains a soul to the need to fulfill these desires. Does this mean that we as a society are prisoners to our desires? Are our souls inharmonious because we bypass moderation and choose to live in excess? I’m not sure if we will see a degeneration of our society like Socrates suggests but I’m starting to see that our private “unleashing of unnecessary and useless pleasures” (561a) is harmful to our souls and we might have to start questioning whether we are abusing the power of freedom.

forms of Forms for reform

Since I feel that we covered the nature of governments rather thoroughly in class this past week, I would like to turn my attention back to the cave from Book VII. Within the cave, Socrates placed not only the chained population but also a group of people standing before the fire manipulating statues to form the shadows. These people, it appears, are the sophists. They have not left the cave completely but are probably just using statues that were passed down to them; they educate the people with ideas they barely understand themselves and only assume their conclusions are correct. This is a perfect example of the blind leading the blind.

However, Socrates points out that to truly educate this population, the man who has escaped from the cave to observe the outside world and the Sun, the Form of Good, must return and teach them himself. But one may ask how he would teach these people who are not even capable of moving their heads to turn around. I believe that Socrates shows us that the philosopher-king, in the cave analogy, would compete with the sophists with statues and shadows of his own. He argues that by directly addressing the people, the enlightened person would become a victim of rebellion and would be attacked for telling such radical “lies.” He knows that those who do not naturally escape the cave would not be able to bear the pain that comes from learning new ideas too quickly and in a manner that is strange to them. However, by using his own statues, which would resemble true objects as much as possible, he would be able to educate the people gradually and in a more convincing manner. One practical example from The Republic that shows Socrates’ belief in this style of teaching occurs when he tells the Noble Lie in order to create unity and maintain order in the city. His lie to the people shows that he is willing to use whatever methods necessary to accomplish what is best for them. By using his own “statues,” Socrates can help soften the natures of the population so that they will be better able to reach the truth.

Tyrant Son

In book VIII, Socrates discusses the four types of unjust city leaders. This dialogue leads into book IX, where Socrates describes the tyrannical son. The tyrant is the worst of the four leaders, because he is the polar opposite of the philosopher-king. The tyrant descends from the democratic leader. He does not start out as a tyrant, but he is exposed to the superfluous desires that come from democracy and the drones that are now present in the city. He is unable to restrain from a lawless lifestyle, unlike his father who had a strict oligarchic father to restrain him. He has no sense of self-control and inevitably indulges in worldly things. The tyrant ultimately becomes selfish, insatiable, and fearful of his life for punishment for crimes he commits. This image that Socrates paints shows how democracy leads to tyranny. Democracy is the first step toward lawlessness, and therefore it is second worst type of leadership behind tyranny for a just city.

Book VIII and Oligarchy

Socrates suggests that the oligarchs would put laws into place that refuse political office to those who haven't sufficient wealth. In practices throughout history, governments have rarely found that necessary. There are a couple faults to the oligarchy I think we should consider. The first fault is that mere possession of wealth does not make one fit to rule the city. The second fault that I see is that there grows a breach between the citizenry and the oligarchs, until there are two cities that are effective. Along this divide between them there comes a war in which the next Constitution will come. The oligarchs will not be willing to divide labor so that farmers farm, and the merchants sell, and so on with the rest of the workers in the city. With these things being said I do not think that they will be able to fight very effectively because they will be afraid and will be loving money and wealth to much to use warriors. Their fear however of the mob or the group will leave them afraid to use them to fight their battles. Furthermore there will be poor people that are too poor to live anywhere in the city and to where will they be put or go? This is something that I think Socrates would never tolerate and have in a just city because the city would not be just if this were to happen. These poor people will have to become beggars in order to survive and with beggars comes thieves and other evil-doers in the oligarchy. I would like to think that people can obtain different wealth and still be equal but the more I read the more I think that it is impossible because people will be wanting more like their fellow man and will become greedy, which in return will make the city unjust.

One Last Post of Children in the Society

This is something that has been on my mind from a few books ago, and it still could apply because the children are the future leaders of the society so this could be a problem. I have a hard time picturing the children of this society. It would probably help if we could draw a picture of the city and label everything and where the common people, leaders, and children would be, but I will do my best to explain and question. Socrates stated about the guardians on 457 d , “And the children, in their turn, will be in common, and neither will a parent know his own offspring, nor a child his parent.” So in this, the child will have to respect every one of the elders in the community because he/she sees them all as his/her parents, and they as their children.

The confusion comes with the children of the common people. I could be wrong, but I am pretty sure the children of the common people can distinguish who their parents are, and they shadow their parents in their work field. If this is true, I feel that the children of the guardians and the children of the common people are bound connect or run into each other somehow (if the guardians’ children are kept in a different part of the city) and then the children will notice that there is something missing in their life. If the guardian’s children find out that they do not have the same relations as the common people’s children have with their parents, they might feel a sort of separation anxiety or something missing in their life. I guess my question is ‘could this happen?’ or am I misreading something.

What's next? A few questions.

Because I am a history major the question of the historical significance of The Republic has stayed with me the whole time i've been reading it. It has obviously been infleuntial to western style thought but to what extent? How much are the ideas of moderation and justice based on Socates' conversations. I read the interpretive essay for books VI and VII and it in my opinion it seemed to state that the breaking of ties with family and sexual stereotypes would allow everyone an equal opportunity to pursue their best interest. This is certaintly idealistic and yet it seems to represent most modern western cultures. If The Republic is seen by many as a catalyst for the western-style school of thought then I can definitely understand its significance.
I have not read book VIII yet so I am anxious to see what happens next. The reason for this anxiety is because it seems Socrates has already proven the city will fail because the philosopher/king can not and will not rule and is also doubtful that "the good" could actually be rationalized by a mortal. If this is the case then what is left for the city in the next seventy pages? For me what seemed like the pursuit of perfection now seems to be turning into some form of ideology that hints at danger. Will Socrates dismantle his city or try to regroup and built it in a differnt manner? These are some of the questions that are on my mind if anyone has input.

Cave Parallels

In this chapter through them discussing the theory of the cave, I am curious as to whether this parallels to the theory that we are “dreaming” instead of living. That our “living” is actually our dreaming. When they talk about how the prisoners can only see shadows and hear echoes but don’t get the full effect it makes me wonder if people these days are doing the same thing. Are we just dreaming and hearing echoes, seeing shadows and not receiving the full effect? Is there more to life than the eye perceives? Could it even parallel to heaven? We are only living life to the extent that we see it but once we get to heaven, will we be blinded because it will be so much more distinct, so much more beautiful, so much more alive than what we are used to seeing each day? I know I’m going off on a silly tangent that doesn’t make sense but reading these theories just kind of gave me all these ideas that I just can’t seem to finish or place. I wonder if people these days are just seeing shadows and not really even thinking to look beyond seeing shadows. It even makes me think about “heaven on earth”. Are people who aren’t Christians really just seeing shadows and hearing echoes when they could be seeing vivid objects, people, thoughts, etc. When you aren’t a Christian and you become one I feel like there is a huge turning point in that you see life from a whole new perspective. Almost like how they say when a guardian goes out to see the light and he comes back to share it with the others who have no idea what it is. As Christians aren’t we supposed to share the light (or gospel) with our brothers and sisters? Isn’t it our job to bring what we have learned and share it with humanity so that they too can experience it? I feel a strong connecton with this passage because I feel like I’m making a lot of resemblances with my faith. I just thought I would throw a few of those ideas out there.

Can you understand what you do not know yet?

In class we had a large discussion on why glaucon could not understand dialectics. It seemed to me that the conclusion that he just wasn't smart enough yet wasn't quite what i was looking for. Because i mean do we all not know something? How can we gain any knowledge at all if we first have to understand it to learn it? Is that not part of understanding something? It seems like socrates himself just doesn't understand it's full meaning, so instead of just saying he couldn't define it he just said that Glaucon couldn't.

Glaucon becoming dialectic

Towards the end of Book VII Glaucon and Socrates discuss becoming dialectic. At 533 a, Socrates tells Glaucon, "You will no longer be able to follow, my dear Glaucon." I think the reason Socrates tells that to Glaucon is because Glaucon isn't far enough on his journey on the divided line. Because dialectic is at the end of one's journey of learning, one cannot be told what it is. Just as Meno wanted Socrates to tell him what virtue is, Glaucon is doing the same thing with the issue of dialectic. And just as Socrates didn't expressly tell Meno what virtue is; he is doing the same thing with Glaucon and dialectic. It is just foolish for Glaucon to think that Socrates will tell him all about becoming dialectic because even Socrates admits that he hasn't accomplished that yet. And that is the beauty of it all; we are in the same way just like Socrates in that we don't know it all, however we are able to use the teachings of Socrates and others to help us on our way to becoming dialectic.

Philosopher Kings

In book six, Socrates and Adeimantus discuss the necessity of philosophers to rule the just city. They decide that a philosopher is has certain traits, like seeking out truth and good. The forms must all be present in order for someone to be considered a philosopher. A person cannot seek only one form of the good. All must be sought equally in order to have true harmony. Not only are these qualities needed to run a just city, but also to have a satisfied soul. In my interpretation of book six, these philosopher kings represent the virtuous guiding qualities in our souls. To obtain justice in our own lives, we must allow the truth-seeking, just traits to control us.

Philosopher Kings: Fit to Rule?

In the issue of philosophers making the best rulers, yes, I agree they have intellect but will a philosopher have the civic-mindedness to rule a group of people who think completely different from him? Their natures are, after all, “always in love with that learning which discloses to them something of the being that is always and does not wander about, driven by generation and decay” (485b). Socrates points out that philosophers have a soul dominated by reason and rational thinking. Their desires and appetite are quieted by the love for learning and pursuing the truth. This is all well and good but when the majority of the people he has rule over are knowledgeable in the civic realm, can true intellect or understanding carry him through? Socrates says that there are only a small number of true philosophers and that they make up the extreme minority. What is the guarantee then for these men be able to stay true, or as Socrates puts it, “What salvation do you see for a philosophic nature so that it will remain in its practice and reach its end” (494a)? Can he even relate to the problems that arise from a city of these thinkers if his own mind is only on the truth? Or will he be unable to relate to the people and even be able to resist the influence of majority. And as Socrates states, “Do you think it will be easy for him to hear through a wall of so many evils” (494d)?

The Philosopher-Statesman

Reading The Republic first for politics classes and second for philosophy, I have definitely noticed a difference in the nature of the material. In a political theory class one analyzes the nature of Socrates’ government: the bureaucracy, the classes, the communal nature of the Guardians’ lifestyle. However, here in philosophy the outlook changes completely and the nature of the text is analyzed more fully. We are here for the argument; the means, not the end of Socrates search. And so the feeling of this book differs significantly.

I think that that different “feeling” is represented well in Book V during Socrates’ debate with Adeimantus (473d-474c) in which he inquires about the difference between kings (politicians) and philosophers, and in Book VI where Adeimantus also notes that all the philosophers he sees are either “quite vicious” or “useless to the city” (487 d-e). They recognize that there is a significant difference between the political and philosophical minds. I believe there to be three main reasons why a politician in a democracy like that in Athens or our own does not always act as a philosopher, some reasons being more innocent than others.

First, obviously, some politicians are doing their job for the money rather than for “the art” of making society more just. He is the least righteous of the types since he consistently put his own welfare above that of the people he represents. He may also be considered the “vicious” type of philosopher, who uses his wisdom only for personal gain. The second type of politician is prevented from philosophizing for the opposite reason. This man is the populist, who, in hopes of pleasing his constituents will violate his own beliefs. He places the voters’ opinion above his own—even though his opinion may be the correct one. Finally there is the politician who knows the right thing and would like to do it, but is prevented from doing so because of time constraints or opposition. This would be well represented by the “useless” philosopher who knows what to do but is never consulted. He will leave politics out of disappointment or frustration. This politician/philosopher, although rare, is the most innocent of the three; he is only stopped because the government does not work in his favor. He would probably provide an apt blueprint for Socrates’ philosopher-king.

Stargazers

In Book VI of the Republic, Socrates compares the treatment of true philosophers in Athens to a ship where ignorant sailors will doing anything(drugging the ship owner) to gain power on the ship while the someone who is adept at navigation not noticed because he is spending is time looking at the stars. While this serves its purpose well and offers a clear analogy for true philosophers vs. the corrupt philosophers that Adeimantus refers to, when I view passage in terms our class discussion about the value of philosophers particularly in modern times, I can't help think some people truly are just stargazers. They may study philosophy with a sense of bewilderment even coming up with ideas that provide them a sense of calm, but they do not take that leap into navigation. To use another metaphor of Socrates they do not become "midwifes" of other peoples ideas.

Philosopher as Ruler

Socrates tells Glaucon that the last crucial component for of the city of necessity to be possible is for philosophy and political power to meet, and thus the rulers must themselves be philosophers (473d). He hesitated to mention it because he sees it as a paradoxical notion. Why does Socrates think that the idea of a philosopher with political power is a paradox?

Mr. Bloom provides a lengthy and (I think) helpful note on this subject. He says that "the philosopher has neither the desire to be a ruler nor would he do what is necessary to impose his rule on unwilling people" (Book V, note 36). It seems as if this description is confined to one type of philosopher, and is likely the sort of philosopher that Socrates and Glaucon agree on ("...rather than lovers of opinion those who delight in each thing that is itself" [480a]).

Maybe Socrates and Glaucon do not think that the philosopher will do what is necessary to impose his rule on unwilling people because the philosopher does not know the form of the good and maybe cannot know it. And without such knowledge the philosopher would have no preeminence for ruling. Hence Socrates' hesitation with completing the argument, as he claims that he is merely "in doubt and seeking", and does not claim to have discovered or established anything about how to actually make a city (or a man for that matter) just (450d).

Book IV

Polemarchus and Adeimantus want Socrates to explain his earlier claim of wives and children being held in common. They want to know why this idea should be ideal and whether it could actually be realized in practice, which interestingly becomes a more broad or general issue for the whole project about making a just city. I think the whole reason behind Socrates wanting to keep wives and children in common is to prevent any attachments that would alter the devotion and the concern of the guardians. (462 a-b) " Is there any greater evil we can mention for a city than that which tears it apart and makes it many instead of one? Or any greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one?" It seems as we discussed in class that Socrates would want the city to be united in pain that for just some of the people in the city to be happy. With the whole idea of the people not knowing which individual is their biological kid it makes the guardians effectively become a big family and the guardians will be encouraged to do what is proper and right. Socrates then goes on to talk about how the city should breed, just like we talked about in class people who breed dogs only want the best dogs and will breed the right dogs together. This is essentially what Socrates is wanting to do in the city, to have the best to mate with the best in order to produce the best. I think a good question comes from when Socrates talks about the women training naked with the men, which could cause problems. Socrates responds by saying that this is the rational way to do things and that people will see this as the norm. (457 a) " These women will wear virtue or excellence instead of clothes." How is it that we can educate everyone into seeing this as the norm, basically reprogramming the way they think on a deeper level? I have issues with this I think. I am not sure how you can just change people's minds so fast and quickly with no repercussion.

Justice vs. Injustice

At the end of class Thursday Miss Merwin asked if it is in justice or injustice if our desire was not fulfilled. If desire is to cause some sort of harm to our body and we chose not to give into our desire would that be injustice or justice. If our desire is not completed leaving some sort of incompletion is that justice or injustice. In 443 d Socrates gives an overview what justice seems to be. That a man is truly concerned with his overall state of being, not just one part but all aspects to create the whole. This idea extends to a just city. There are numerous components towards the working/making of a city. The homogenous goal is specifically for the greater good of the city. With that in mind I believe Socrates would argue that if a desire is not adequately met, we must still observe the overall effect on the body.

An example used in class if our desire was to have more food than our body needed but we deny our desire to eat would that be considered injustice or justice. According to Socrates I think it would be considered justice, even though our desire is not satisfied it is only one component. The unified goal is in the best interest of our body's health. Not giving into our desire is best for our health establishing justice rather than injustice. Even so Socrates argues that the city is not interested in the happiness of one single person but the overall happiness of the homogeneous city.