In chapter 11 of book 1 in Nic. Ethics, Aristotle addresses the notion of descendents affecting one’s happiness. I agree with Aristotle’s argument that “when friends of the departed fare well, and likewise when they fare badly, this has an influence on those who are departed, but of such a kind and amount as neither to make the happy not be happy nor anything else of the sort.” (1101 b).
The happiness of a person is dependent upon said person, not the actions of others around them, or those who descend from them. Happiness as it is used in this context is a state of life that can only be judged upon one’s death. But, once the happiness of a person’s life has been assessed, it cannot be changed by honor or disgrace from others.
The public reputation of a family may be helped or harmed, but as stated in book 9 of the Republic, this would only satisfy the honor-loving person, not the truth-seeking one who is ultimately the just one. Therefore, it is not necessary for a son to seek out virtuosity in order to maintain the honor of a departed predecessor. This neither affects the departed’s happiness nor assures happiness for the son who is seeking honor for the sake of others.
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