Wishers Can't Be Choosers

While reading Book III, I found an interesting statement by Aristotle in regard to the nature of happiness. He states that “we wish to be happy and say so, while it would not fit the meaning to say we choose to be happy, since, universally, choice seems to be concerned with things that are up to us” (Ch. 2; 29-31). My first observation was that his point seems to clearly contradict some ideas regarding the state of one’s emotions, namely those who say that a person chooses to be happy or content in a situation. However, I followed along and agreed to his conclusion mainly on the grounds that I did not know it would become such an issue later. After all, here his definition of “wishing” would make the acquisition of happiness a wish since it is aimed at an end rather than a means to achieve that end.

However, as I continued, I found what appeared to be at least a slight contradiction in his reasoning. In Chapter 5, Aristotle states that “to say that no one is willingly wretched or unwillingly happy seems to be partly false and partly true, for no one is happy unwillingly, but baseness is something willing” (15-17). I have a feeling that I am only getting caught in a trap of semantics here and that there is really no problem of contradiction, despite my possible disagreement with his initial assertion. This last statement was made to support his belief that choices are either virtuous or vicious; the final product of happiness would not be a choice, but instead, an end reached through virtuous choices. Meanwhile, baseness would derive from vicious choices.

Then I understand what Aristotle means by his statement that “one cannot choose to be happy” since one chooses the things that will make him happy, but not the act of happiness itself. It does make sense technically then. One cannot choose to be in a certain state but only scenarios that would place them in that state. For instance, I would not choose to be wealthy, but instead choose to follow a career that would make me wealthy.