The Scents of Sauce and Prey

In Chapter 10 of Book III, Aristotle decides that temperance must have to do with bodily pleasures. But not those related to sight or hearing, because people do not speak of those who delight too much in the pleasures associated with sight or hearing as dissipated (1118a: 2-6). Yet with regards to smell, there are scents that he thinks remind one of "things they yearn for," such as sauces (reminds one of food) (1118a: 12-14). What follows from taking delight in such scents is a growth in the associated desire.

For instance, the scent of BBQ sauce makes me hungry. Sometimes when I smell BBQ sauce, I wish that I could be eating something with BBQ sauce on it instead of just smelling the BBQ sauce. Is it likely that if I indulged in satisfying my desire to eat something with BBQ sauce on it more frequently, then the delight that comes from smelling BBQ sauce will be greater and thus my desire for ingesting BBQ sauce?

Aristotle does not believe that animals take pleasure in sight, sound, or smell, "except incidentally." (1118a: 18-19) What is odd about his claims about animals is that he does not think that meat-eating animals take pleasure in the smell of their prey, nor in the sight of their prey, nor in the sound of their prey. I wonder if his claim still holds up in modern science. It seems strange to claim that meat-eating animals take pleasure in eating meat (like humans) but do not share the pleasure associated with the scent of food with humans. Based on my own experience, I think dogs react differently to the sight of something they might like to eat than they do to the scent of something they might like to eat, but maybe it is not a pleasurable experience although their behavior suggests otherwise.

Wishers Can't Be Choosers

While reading Book III, I found an interesting statement by Aristotle in regard to the nature of happiness. He states that “we wish to be happy and say so, while it would not fit the meaning to say we choose to be happy, since, universally, choice seems to be concerned with things that are up to us” (Ch. 2; 29-31). My first observation was that his point seems to clearly contradict some ideas regarding the state of one’s emotions, namely those who say that a person chooses to be happy or content in a situation. However, I followed along and agreed to his conclusion mainly on the grounds that I did not know it would become such an issue later. After all, here his definition of “wishing” would make the acquisition of happiness a wish since it is aimed at an end rather than a means to achieve that end.

However, as I continued, I found what appeared to be at least a slight contradiction in his reasoning. In Chapter 5, Aristotle states that “to say that no one is willingly wretched or unwillingly happy seems to be partly false and partly true, for no one is happy unwillingly, but baseness is something willing” (15-17). I have a feeling that I am only getting caught in a trap of semantics here and that there is really no problem of contradiction, despite my possible disagreement with his initial assertion. This last statement was made to support his belief that choices are either virtuous or vicious; the final product of happiness would not be a choice, but instead, an end reached through virtuous choices. Meanwhile, baseness would derive from vicious choices.

Then I understand what Aristotle means by his statement that “one cannot choose to be happy” since one chooses the things that will make him happy, but not the act of happiness itself. It does make sense technically then. One cannot choose to be in a certain state but only scenarios that would place them in that state. For instance, I would not choose to be wealthy, but instead choose to follow a career that would make me wealthy.

Non-Willing

A large portion of class today was spent defining actions that Aristotle titles "non-willing". Now several assumptions of what this term may mean were discussed in class, but the only clear-cut difference between "non-willing" and "unwilling" that Aristotle provides is that those who are "non-willing" do not feel it necessary to repent for their actions unlike the "unwilling" . The most notable possibility that we came up with was the example of someone who was so intoxicated that they forgot all of their negative actions and therefore could not feel remorse or repent for them. While, I think this example has the potential to meet the terms of "non-willing". I do think that everyone if put in this situation would feel incapable of repentance. I think that some would do more than make to not become intoxicated again but also make up for whatever mistakes they unknowingly made while intoxicated. Also, it seems possible to be "non-willing" in other ways besides be intoxicated for Aristotle makes the comment that anger has the potential to produce "non-willing" actions. As I see it the only negative actions that constitute the term "non-willing" are those that are done in some state where one gives up control of the rational part of their soul and after later realizing their mistakes blame the state in which they were in and not themselves. An example being someone who in gives into impulse and attacks someone blames their temper and then later does nothing to repent. Perhaps, I am confused but the lack of clarity in this section is uncharacteristic of the rest of the Nicomachean ethics thus far.

Opinions and Choices

In class today we talked about how it’s not our opinions who make us who we are, but it’s our choices. This is something that I have had a problem with lately, and I think it is really neat that we ended up talking about it in our philosophy class. Who knew? It is human nature to be judgmental, no matter who you are you are going to judge a person whether you speak it out loud or not. Sometimes I have problems with judging people on their opinions about things; even when I know that I should be respectful about other people’s opinions, I try to go out of the way to end the conversation just so I don’t have to listen anymore because I get so frustrated inside with what they are saying.

When I was listening in class I found that if you truly want to get to know someone, do not base it off of their opinions, but base it off of their stories because it is our choices that matter. It is our choices that shape who we are and what we will become. Needless to say, today was a good day in philosophy class, especially if we get participation points for watching the wasps!

Virture of Character

In the beginning of Chapter 9 in Book Two, Aristotle states, "It has been said sufficiently, then, that virtue of character is a mean condition, and in what way, namely because it is a mean between two kinds of vice, the one resulting from excess and the other from deficiency, and that it is such a mean condition on account of being apt to hit the mean in feelings and actions." This seems to be a fair explanation of what virtue is. This also suggests that going too far towards deficiency or too far towards excess is not being the most virtuous. I would agree on the first part about going too far towards deficiency would result in a lack of virtue and would not be something worth striving for. However, I don't agree with the latter - that going too far towards excess would be an inordinate amount of virtue and would be something not worth striving for (given that virtue is a means between the two vices). While an over-excess in many things can become destructive (excess desires of food, etc.), I think virtue is something different. It seems reasonable that you would want to be virtuous in excess (all the way) then be in the middle of the two vices. The more virtue you have, even in excess, the better.

Is pleasure happyness?

It seems that earlier in the book it talks about whether or not pleasure as being happy. But this seems an odd question because we haven't even defined pleasure, or being happy. I would like to things that made you happy would also please you. If that makes any since tell me, if not i understand. It just seems to me that if you are doing things that are of the good then you would take pleasure in them and be happy.

Remarks to Book 3

"In general, choice seems to relate to the things that are in our power. By choosing what is good or bad we are men of a certain character, which we are not by holding certain opinions." Our character is determined by our choices, not by our opinions I feel. "The object of choice being one of the things in our own power which is desired after deliberation, choice will be deliberate desire of things in our own power; for when we have reached a judgement as a result of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our deliberation." We decide what to choose after deliberating and the choice then is our desire I feel. "To the unjust and the self-indulgent men it was open at the beginning not to become men of this kind, and so they are unjust and self-indulgent voluntarily; but now that they have become so it is not possible for them not to be so. But not only are the vices of the soul voluntary, but those of the body also for some men, whom we accordingly blame." The bad man becomes bad by choice and then finds it impossible to shed the bad habits. I also think that we are good or bad by choice and we are not born that way. We make the decisions which can alter our lives and can ultimately lead to good or bad things.