Tuesday, April 6, 2010
Non-Willing
A large portion of class today was spent defining actions that Aristotle titles "non-willing". Now several assumptions of what this term may mean were discussed in class, but the only clear-cut difference between "non-willing" and "unwilling" that Aristotle provides is that those who are "non-willing" do not feel it necessary to repent for their actions unlike the "unwilling" . The most notable possibility that we came up with was the example of someone who was so intoxicated that they forgot all of their negative actions and therefore could not feel remorse or repent for them. While, I think this example has the potential to meet the terms of "non-willing". I do think that everyone if put in this situation would feel incapable of repentance. I think that some would do more than make to not become intoxicated again but also make up for whatever mistakes they unknowingly made while intoxicated. Also, it seems possible to be "non-willing" in other ways besides be intoxicated for Aristotle makes the comment that anger has the potential to produce "non-willing" actions. As I see it the only negative actions that constitute the term "non-willing" are those that are done in some state where one gives up control of the rational part of their soul and after later realizing their mistakes blame the state in which they were in and not themselves. An example being someone who in gives into impulse and attacks someone blames their temper and then later does nothing to repent. Perhaps, I am confused but the lack of clarity in this section is uncharacteristic of the rest of the Nicomachean ethics thus far.
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It is true that it seems like Aristotle does not give this concept as much elaboration as the text's other topics. To me, the idea of non-willing is more of an afterthought, an extra stage between willing and unwilling action. Aristotle wanted to provide for actions that may be done as sort of a "zombie" which seems to be a popular trend in psychological/consciousness studies. Problem is, we cannot seem to find a reasonable scenario where a person would naturally be in a nonwilling state. I suppose Aristotle is just covering his bases with this one, though it does open up an interesting discussion.
ReplyDeleteRegret for something you did (like choosing to drink so much you lost control and memory) is distinct from regret for something you cannot even claim as your own (the things you are said to have done but which, by not having memory, you do not encounter as willed). So the person in the example regrets willingly drinking so much but not the things they did but cannot own. Also, someone who is so indifferent to themselves, their actions, the ends and the circumstances as not to care about the action at all, good or bad, seems to be nonwilling. A nonwilled action doesn't matter to you at all, no matter how it turns out. It seems only possible to judge it properly retrospectively.
ReplyDeletei.e., a nonwilled action may be one where any outcome is equal to you, thus the action could have been opposite or other and it would have made no difference because you just don't care. THis must be distinct from merely thinking you don't care but still...it seems to happen.
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