Meno

The dialogue between Socrates and Meno ends with Socrates' declaration that, according to their line of reasoning, "virtue would be neither an inborn quality nor taught" but rather "a gift from the gods" (99e-100b). But knowledge of virtue would only be reached once they agree upon a definition of what virtue is. They did agree to say that virtue is either the whole or part of wisdom and that it must be beneficial, but they decided that it was not teachable since there did not seem to be anyone who successfully passed on knowledge of it or claimed to be a teacher of it, and thus concluded that virtue is not knowledge. If it is true that virtue is not knowledge but rather a gift from the gods, could it still not be attained or bestowed in some way? It seems that if virtue is considered a gift from the gods then there may be some way of earning it, but the need for a definition of virtue still prevents us from knowing what it is that we are after. What's more is that the inquiry has, at this point in the reasoning, reached a point where we need knowledge of the divine (not only what virtue is, but also how to communicate or interact with them to receive this gift). Thus it could be that virtue is knowledge, but it must be a type of knowledge (namely divine) that cannot be taught by men.